0.11 The carter and reagan years: 1977-89  (Page 5/10)

If Golden and his contributors hoped to reverse Carter’s course, they were destined for disappointment. Ronald Reagan, who regarded the science advisory system as an even lower priority than had Carter, viewed it as nothing more than a special interest lobby.

In June 1981, Reagan nominated George A. (Jay) Keyworth II as his science advisor and OSTP director. Keyworth had been a weapons physicist at the Los Alamos National Laboratory throughout his career and was virtually unknown outside of the defense science community, and his nomination did little to allay academic anxiety regarding the Reagan administration’s interest in science. Nor did the fact that he had been suggested to the president by the hawkish Edward Teller, whom many establishment scientists had still not forgiven for his role in the Oppenheimer affair. However, by December 1985, when he resigned both positions, Keyworth had won over a good many skeptics.

Recognizing the problem, Keyworth made special efforts to establish good working relations with both the university-based scientific community and the federal R&D line agencies. In consultation with the Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public Policy (COSEPUP) of the National Academies of Sciences and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, Keyworth arranged a series of annual research briefings in areas COSEPUP identified; and on the advice of the National Academy of Engineering, he strongly endorsed the Presidential Young Investigator awards, prestigious post-doctoral appointments intended to encourage outstanding PhDs in science, and particularly engineering, to pursue academic research careers.

However, in his first appearance before a large scientific audience (the April 1981 annual American Association for the Advancement of Science’s Science and Technology Policy Colloquium in Washington, DC), he made it clear that he intended to be a White House team player rather than an emissary from the scientific community, and that he had no intention of recommending the restoration of PSAC. Barbara J. Culliton, “Keyworth Gives First Speech,” Science (July 7, 1981), 183-84.

Much of the initial anxiety about Reagan’s support for the broad-based national research system abated with the submission of his proposed budget to Congress in January 1982. As anticipated, substantial increases in defense-related R&D were proposed, along with sharp cuts in non-defense applied research and development, on the grounds that the latter should be left to the private sector. But the budget did propose substantial increases for basic research support, much to the relief of university-based scientists, and these increases continued over the next three years.

In April 1984, Keyworth emphasized the administration’s commitment to basic research, noting with approval the elimination of costly energy demonstration projects that were better left to the private sector. G.A. Keyworth, Jr., “Four Years of Reagan Science Policy: Notable Shift in Priorities,” Science (April 6, 1984), 9-13. Two of these demonstration projects were international collaborative efforts, one involving Germany, the other Japan. Their elimination provided seeming evidence for the well-worn charge that the United States was an unreliable foreign partner. Although such programs had been cut back significantly during the Carter administration, they disappeared almost completely under Reagan. Keyworth noted that total federal R&D obligations had increased from $35 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $53.1 billion in fiscal year 1985, with most of the increase in defense R&D, which grew from $16.5 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $34.2 billion in fiscal year 1985. Total federal obligations for basic research increased from $5.1 billion in fiscal year 1981 to $7.9 billion in fiscal year 1985.