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Were these fundraising goals reasonable? Perhaps not, but the primary body that committed to them, the Society's board of trustees, was the same entity re­sponsible for attaining them. It is not difficult to understand how the Society found itself in such a predicament. First, society leadership had worked with the advi­sory committee to establish an extremely ambitious set of goals for the level of ser­vices it should and would provide. Second, it had sold its primary stakeholders, including government officials, the general public, and its own programmatic staff, on the importance of those goals, various elements of which were crucial for gain­ing the support of a wide range of constituencies. And third, it had those goals further validated by the settlement of the attorney general's investigation, but with the added requirement that the Society submit balanced budgets for the next four years. With all of the programmatic elements in place and despite a great deal of positive momentum for its renewed public service role, the Society found itself with neither the cash nor the types of assets needed to generate the cash flow to fulfill its promise. This combination of developments left Society leadership with essentially two choices: (1) publicly give up on the plan that had so recently been launched and restructure or possibly dismantle the Society or (2) take a leap of faith, hoping that by becoming a more inclusive and public-service-minded institution, it could enlarge its base of potential funders, both private and public. It chose the latter.

Seeking affiliations, 1991-1992

The Society's leadership had to be initially encouraged by its improving public reputation. An article in the New York Times reviewing the Society's new exhibition "Paris 1889: American Artists at the Universal Exposition" was positively glow­ing: "Visitors will immediately sense a place different in spirit from the dour institution that was there before."

Kimmelman (1990).
The article also identified and discussed vari­ous new initiatives at the Society, stating that "for an institution that for decades had shown scant interest in the public it ostensibly served, all of this comes as noth­ing less than an extraordinary change of affairs." These developments underscore "the impression that the Society is finally in capable hands" and are "the most immediate demonstration of the society's new mission to transform itself from a kind of private club into an institution that truly serves the public. . . . There is now the promise, at least, that it will become one of the city's most engaging cultural centers."

The positive public response to its programs, however, did not translate into increases in the Society's unrestricted cash balances. The Society's cash flow prob­lems grew even more acute in late 1990 and early 1991, and management feared at one point that it would not be able to make payroll. The Society was able to avert a crisis when it secured a $ 1 million one-year loan from the Golden Family Foundation, which was collateralized with the Society's neighboring townhouse on Seventy-Sixth Street.

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Source:  OpenStax, The new-york historical society: lessons from one nonprofit's long struggle for survival. OpenStax CNX. Mar 28, 2008 Download for free at http://cnx.org/content/col10518/1.1
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